Drivers of cost system development in hospitals: Results of a survey. by Cardinaels, Eddy et al.
DRIVERS OF COST SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT IN HOSPITALS: 
RESULTS OF A  SURVEY 
EDDY CARDINAELS •  FILIP ROODHOOFT •  GUSTAAF VAN  HERCK Drivers of  cost system development in hospitals: 
Results of a survey 
Eddy Cardinaelsa, *, Filip Roodhooftb and Gustaaf van Herckc 
a Assistant Professor in Accounting, Faculty of  Economics and Business 
Administration, Universiteit van Tilburg, P.O.Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The 
Netherlands 
b Professor in Accounting, Department of  Applied Economics, Katholieke 
Universiteit Leuven, Naamsestraat 69 and Vlerick Leuven Gent Management School 
Vlamingenstraat 83 B-3000 Leuven, Belgium 
C Professor in Accounting and Hospital Management, Department of  Applied 
Economics, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Naamsestraat 69, B-3000 Leuven, 
Belgium 
* Corresponding author. Tel: + 31  13 4668231; Fax: +32 13 466 8001. 
e-mail address:e.cardinaels@uvt.nl Drivers of cost system development in hospitals: 
Results of a survey 
Abstract 
While many hospitals are under pressure to become more cost efficient, new costing 
systems  such as  Activity-based costing (ABC) may form  a  solution.  However, the 
factors that may facilitate (or inhibit) cost system changes towards ABC have not yet 
been disentangled in a specific hospital context. Via a survey study of hospitals, we 
discovered that cost system development in hospitals could largely be explained by 
hospital specific factors. Issues such as the support of  the medical parties towards cost 
system use, the awareness of problems with the existing legal cost system, the way 
hospitals  and physicians arrange reimbursements,  should be  considered if hospitals 
refine  their  cost  system.  Conversely,  ABC-adoption  issues  that  were  found  to  be 
crucial  in  other  industries  are  less  important.  Apparently,  installing  a  cost  system 
requires  a  different  approach  in  hospital  settings.  Especially,  results  suggest  that 
hospital management should not  underestimate the  interest of the physician in the 
process of  redesigning cost systems. 
Keywords: Activity Based Costing, Organizational Change, Cost Control, Hospital context 1. Introduction 
With margins on the decline, more restrictive reimbursement schemes based on 
diagnostic-related groups (DRGs), increasing complexity and rising costs, the health 
care sector faces a new challenge of becoming more cost efficient to survive in this 
changing environment [1,2, 3]. More developed cost systems such as Activity Based 
Costing  (ABC),  may  facilitate  this  strive  for  cost efficiency.  ABC  provides  more 
detailed cost information on the activities of  the hospital, which could typically result 
in better cost reduction and cost management [4,  5]. In other industries, it has proven 
to  be successful since firms  that extensively use ABC  outperform similar matched 
firms that do not adopt ABC, mainly through more efficient cost control efforts [6, 7]. 
However, while there are different levels of cost system design, it seems remarkable 
that the number of hospitals collecting cost on a more detailed basis remains limited 
[2]. Relative to other industries, the health care sector still lags behind [8]. The reason 
for this discrepancy has hardly ever been investigated. The main contribution of the 
present study is that it provides an insight in the factors that in fact drive (or inhibit) 
further  cost  system  development  in  the  health  care  sector.  Via  this  insight, 
management  may  better  understand the  crucial  factors  for  promoting  cost  system 
improvement in a health care environment. 
As  a  starting point we  look  at  ABC-adoption in  other  industries.  We  will test 
whether the few existing factors  known to  be associated with the adoption of more 
accurate costing systems in these industries, are applicable for the health care sector 
[9,  10,  11].  Secondly, it is  important to note that the present study takes the specific 
behavioral  and  organizational  factors  of the  sector  into  account  [12].  Unlike 
manufacturing companies, health care providers in many countries are for  refunding 
1 purposes legally required to allocate costs in a predefined manner e.g. Medicare Cost 
System in the US, [13]. Hospitals may find this legal cost system sufficient and hence 
more refmed costing methods such as  activity-based costing may not be considered. 
Important powerful coalitions [12] such as the physicians may have a stake in whether 
the  cost  system  is  further  developed.  Thirdly,  this  study  further  recognizes  that 
implementing  cost  system  refinements  in  hospitals  typically  requires  progress  in 
stages before full adoption is achieved [2,  11]. 
The results of our survey, conducted in the hospital sector, show that cost system 
improvement in hospitals, is largely determined by health care specific factors such as 
the dissatisfaction with the legal system, the support of medical staff to cost system 
use, the way the reimbursements between hospitals and their physicians are arranged 
etc ... This  seems to  suggest that health care management should focus  on hospital 
specific  elements  in  order  to  facilitate  ABC  adoption.  Factors  observed  in  other 
industries have less explanatory power and as such they may be less crucial for further 
promoting cost system change. 
2. Literature Review 
In many countries hospitals are legally required for  refunding purposes to have a 
predefined  cost  allocation  scheme  [13,  14].  This  makes  them  unique  to  other 
industries where such a legal obligation does not exist. The legal system mostly takes 
the  form  of  a  step-down  allocation  of  costs  from  service  departments  (e.g. 
administration,  cafeteria,  laundry,  etc.)  to  revenue  generating  departments  such  as 
acute care, surgery, laboratory. Sometimes cost are further allocated down to patient-
level.  Often the legal system uses  a large  set of pre-defmed cost drivers (See U.S. 
2 Medicare cost report in Eldenburg and Kallapur [13], [15]). While such legal systems 
are quite elaborated, it does not preclude management from adjusting the cost system 
to make it more relevant for their internal decisions [15, 16]. Rather than immediately 
installing ABC, hospitals tend to change gradually towards ABC. They often start by 
adjusting their existing legal system or they may first thoroughly consider ABC [2, 9, 
17].  In that respect, hospitals seem to adhere similar implementation stages as  other 
industries [11, 18]. 
Our goal is to disentangle different levels of cost system design and the drivers in 
a health care setting that explain this process of  changing to ABC. To our knowledge, 
evidence on this matter remains very scarce. As a first step we look at general drivers 
of ABC-adoption from other industries. Next, we discuss several elements from our 
own review of the health care sector that may drive (or inhibit) cost system change. 
Finally, we provide specific control variables for the level of cost system in a health 
care setting. Table 1 summarizes the drivers we identified and their expected direction 
on cost system development. The next sections further explain these issues. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
2.1.  General drivers of  cost system development 
There only exist a limited number of studies that identified some general drivers 
of cost system improvement for  firms  in other industries.  Below we provide more 
detail on those general drivers that are expected to be relevant for a hospital setting. 
Cost  variability.  Firms  with  a  higher  level  of indirect  overhead  and  greater 
heterogeneity in the way products make use of the firm's resources, are expected to 
introduce more refined costing systems  [9,11,  19].  This issue may playa role in a 
3 hospital  context.  Hospitals  are  often  known  as  settings  with  many  indirect  cost 
categories  and  they  treat  various  patients  via  divergent  care  processes  that  often 
consume overhead differently [17]. 
Cost  importance.  This  issue  mainly  captures  the  way  firms  in  other  industries 
perceive cost data as crucial for their decisions and their competitive position [20, 21]. 
Given the current pressure on margins, this issue may especially apply to  hospitals. 
We predict that the stronger the importance attached to cost data, the more likely that 
a hospital will adapts its cost system. 
Quality link.  Firms that focus on quality often link their formal quality programs 
with more accurate ABC-systems [10].  Similar considerations coexist in health care. 
Hospitals  initiating programs to  improve the quality  of the  care processes may be 
more in need of a cost system that accurately captures the cost of these different care 
process [4, 17]. 
System State.  This issue concerns the general elaboration of the IT  -system within 
a  firm.  The more  elaborated and integrated the  system and the  more performance 
measures it gathers, the easier it is to introduce ABC-systems that make use of IT-
systems and their information [22].  However, given that systems in health care often 
are designed to only fulfil  legal requirements [15], the culture and the resources for 
hospital  systems  to  integrate  different  applications  and  to  issue  performance 
information may not yet be well established [2]. 
Perceived complexity.  This issue in fact captures whether the firm's operational 
environment is perceived as  complex. Arguments in other industries seem to suggest 
that complex-dynamic organizations may especially benefit more from more accurate 
cost systems  [23,  24].  This seems true for  complex organizations such as  hospitals 
that often treat highly complex care processes [3]. However, the perceived complexity 
4 might  obstruct  cost  system  improvement,  since  the  ABC  problem  reqUIres  very 
specific data from these complex processes which may be too difficult to  obtain in 
hospital settings [5]. 
2.2.  Hospital specific elements in cost system development 
Hospitals  have  some  umque  features  that  are  typically  not  observed  in  other 
industries [25]. An important contribution is that our study is one of  the few to discuss 
the  link of some of these  features  with the  level of cost system design in  hospital 
settings. Below we give an overview of  these hospital specific elements. 
Satisfaction legal system.  As already mentioned, hospitals are legally required to 
use a predefined cost allocation scheme. This unique setting allows us to test to which 
extent hospitals are satisfied with this system. Due to the level of detail, satisfaction 
may  be  high  such  that  hospitals  may  not  screen  other  cost  system  options  [26]. 
Conversely,  criticisms  as  that the  legal  system would still produce unreliable  cost 
estimates may initiate cost system change [16]. 
Use  legal  system.  This  factor  can  be  perceived  as  slightly  different  from  the 
previous  one.  While  being  unsatisfied  about  the  legal  system,  hospitals  may  still 
consider the system sufficient and consequently use it for their decisions. However if 
management questions the  usefulness  of these  figures  [15]  hospitals  may  be  more 
likely to change towards refined costing such as ABC. 
Organizational support.  This aspect captures the organizational support towards 
cost system use. While cost innovations in other industries flow from top management 
support  [12],  hospitals  are  further  unique  in  a  sense  that they  have to  work  with 
physicians  that  are  implicitly  contracted  without  being  employed  for  the  hospital 
5 [25,27]. As physicians are responsible for a large part of  the health care expenditures 
[28], their support towards cost control in general may be important for  further cost 
system enhancement. Besides management and physicians, the support of  the heads of 
various nursing departments is  an additional factor that should not be overlooked. In 
sum, hospitals may be further evolved on the spectrum of cost system design when 
different organizational members support cost control. 
Management-physician  conflict.  In  hospitals,  physicians  often  perceIve  cost 
control  as  very  different  from  management.  Physicians  dictate  that  the  provider-
patient relationship is quite unique and do not want to give up the freedom to deploy 
as much resources as needed for the specific care of  a patient [29]. This often does not 
stroke with ideas of central management that needs to plan resources for the hospital 
as  a whole [30]. It has been shown that potential conflict between parties can arise 
that may hamper any innovation, such as  cost system improvements  [25,  31].  Such 
conflict  is  even  more  likely  if physicians  feel  that they  are  controlled  by  central 
management.  This  is  especially true if cost allocations  are  only used for  assessing 
(controlling) financial arrangements between physicians and hospitals [32]. Our study 
assesses  the  level  of conflict  (directly  by  asking  management  to  asses  whether 
relations with their physicians are optimal or not, and indirectly by asking the degree 
of control through cost system use) as  a factor that may drive or inhibit cost system 
change in hospitals.  Cost system improvements such as ABC are  more  likely when 
relations with physicians are less conflicting or in other words more optimal. 
Method of  reimbursement. Reimbursement of  health care providers (e.g. hospitals, 
physicians) by health care payers (e.g.  governments,  insurers) typically consists  of 
financial flows for the operational cost of  the hospital and physician labor [13, 33]. In 
many  countries  financial  flows  are  centrally  collected  by  one  party  (mostly  the 
6 hospital) who than agrees with the other party on how to split these flows between the 
hospital  and  the physician.  To  this  end,  several  schemes  exist that  can  either  be 
classified as retrospective, in which the physician receives his fee minus a payment on 
the basis of  the own costs he incurs (physician cost based), or as prospective in which 
physicians receive a  fixed  'percentage' of the total revenues  or financial  surpluses 
(profit) of  the hospital [34]. 
The reimbursement scheme may have an effect on the level of  cost system design. 
If  they remain physician cost based (retrospective), payments are based on the indirect 
overhead assigned to a specific physician [33, 34]. Management may then not be very 
motivated to control costs, because physicians simply pay back most of the hospital 
costs. In addition physicians may prefer a pre-defined legal cost system, as they may 
fear  that  new  cost  systems  give  management  more  discretion  to  maximize  the 
financial streams for the hospital [13,  35]. New ABC systems, may lead to endless 
debates  between hospitals and physicians over the  specific assignment of overhead 
costs, which may hamper any cost system change [14]. Conversely under prospective 
systems, payments are at least not physician cost based.  Furthermore, if payment is 
based on surplus (profit) rather than on total revenues this may create some incentives 
for cost control and as such there may be a need for ABC [36]. 
2.3. Specific control variables 
Prior work suggests a positive relation between firm size and the level of ABC-
adoption [9,  10,  11]  did not find  such an effect.  Evidence in the health care sector 
suggests  that larger hospitals  in terms  of bed size  more extensively use  their cost 
system [2].  We therefore take  'Bedsize' as  a  first potential control variable of the 
7 level of cost system development.  As  a second control variable we  check whether 
hospitals are involved in a merger. Those hospitals that struggle for survival are often 
restructuring their operations via mergers and therefore limited resources are not spent 
on improving the cost systems [2]. Mergers take up most of  the time and cost system 
improvements are probably postponed until the merger is completed. 
3. Research Method 
3.1. Research Sample 
The survey was conducted on a sample of hospitals,  located in Flemish part of 
Belgium. Similar to most other countries, all hospitals in our sample are required to 
issue a legal cost report based on an elaborated set of  drivers in a step-down allocation 
scheme from service to revenue generating departments. In addition, these hospitals 
also  agree on various reimbursement schemes with their physicians.  A total of 120 
questionnaires were issued to either general hospitals, academic hospitals, psychiatric 
hospitals or specialized hospitals. The survey administered questions to  identify the 
stage of cost system development and the hospital specific and general drivers that are 
possibly linked with the level of cost system design (sections 3.2 and 3.3  give more 
detail about the survey items). The survey was either addressed to the chief executive 
officer  of the  hospital  facilities  or  the  chief of the  administration  and  financial 
department. These respondents are most likely to be informed about the design and 
the use of cost systems in their hospital. 
Of the 120 questionnaires, we received 50 valid responses. This corresponds to a 
response rate of about 42%. Of the 50 valid replies, 48% came from general private 
8 hospitals, 10% from general public hospitals, 38% from psychiatric facilities and the 
remaining 4% from either academic or specialized private hospitals. It is important to 
note that the sample's distribution is not significantly different from the distribution 
within the total population of 120 Flemish hospitals (Chi-square:  2.3;  p = 0.13).  In 
terms of size our sample counted 20% small facilities with less then 200  beds, 56% 
intermediate-sized hospitals with 200 to 499 beds and 24% large hospitals with over 
500 beds. 
3.2. Dependent variable 
The  pnmary  dependent  variable  for  our  study  is  the  stage  of cost  system 
development. Via our survey study we were able to identify three possible levels of 
cost system  design.  A  first  group  of hospitals  only  installed  the  legal  system.  A 
second group of hospitals is in the process of changing their cost system. Either they 
started with  small  adjustments  to  their  legal  system  by  introducing  more  specific 
drivers and cost objects (e.g. patient-levels, DRG-levels) or they were in the process 
of considering ABC  [2,  9].  This group  may  be  situated on a sort  of 'intermediate 
level' in the process of change towards more refined costing systems. The last group 
is on a more advanced level of cost system refinement. They actually indicated to be 
experimenting with ABC (Cfr.  adoption phase;  [11]) and as  a result of this exercise 
they developed an adapted cost system. Table 2 shows how the sample of 50 hospitals 
is  distributed across these three possible development stages of cost system design. 
One should further note that hospitals in phase 1 are somehow distinct from the two 
other groups. Unlike hospitals in phase 2 and 3, these hospitals do nothing in terms of 
9 cost system refinement. In the result section, we report an additional model based on 
this dichotomy. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
3.2. Independent variables 
The general drivers and most of  the hospital specific elements, except for the type 
of reimbursement scheme, were measured via multiple (e.g. two or more) items that 
were in fact based on our arguments of  the literature review. Appendix A displays the 
set of items issued. Respondents indicated the relevance for each item on a five-point 
Likert-scale (1= strongly disagree;  5= strongly agree).  A first set contains items for 
the general drivers such as cost variability, cost importance, quality link, system state 
and perceived complexity.  The next set focuses  on the  remaining hospital specific 
issues such as organizational support, satisfaction with and the use of  the legal system 
and the level of conflict between management and physicians. We preferred multiple 
items because they capture more of a construct than single items [1, 37]. However to 
test whether our items actually capture the presumed construct, factor analyses were 
performed on both the sets of general drivers and hospital specific factors. The results 
of these factor  analyses are  displayed in panel A of table  3.  Results show that the 
derived factors correspond closely to the constructs of  the literature review, save for a 
few exceptions that will be discussed below. 
Regarding  the  general  drivers,  it  is  important  to  note  that  the  construct  cost 
variability and cost importance form one factor "Cost_  var". Apparently greater cost 
variability is  a synonym for  more importance attached to  cost data.  All items of the 
10 second factor "Syst_state" indeed relate to the state oflT-systems in the hospital. The 
third factor  "Complexity" forms  the  construct for  the perceived complexity of the 
hospital processes and the cost allocation.  Finally, we mention that our last factor 
does only partially captures our construct for the link of  the cost system with quality. 
It only loads high on the quality item F (Table Al in Appendix A). However, this last 
factor  has  also  high  loadings  on  item  G  measuring  the  extent  to  which  systems 
generate various performance measures. We label this factor "PerClink" as the degree 
of focus on performance measures in a hospital. Shields [12]  suggests that this issue 
may indeed be relevant if ABC adoptions want to succeed. Analysis on the hospital 
specific items resulted in four factors with main items that indeed correspond to the 
presumed construct. Only the second factor related to organizational support does not 
load high on management support (Item L), suggesting that the views of  management 
on cost control are divergent from the views of the medical staff. We label this factor 
"supp  _ med" as the support of medical parties towards cost control. The other factors 
are labeled as "sat_legal", "use_legal" and "conflict" according to their construct. 
Similar as to Krumwiede [11, p. 249-250] we want use the factors as independent 
variables for explaining the level of cost system design (section 3.1) To this end, we 
calculated for  each hospital a composite score for the derived factors.  A composite 
factor score is an aggregated score of responses giving the most weight to items that 
load high on that specific factor. On average, they have a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation of 1 and correlations between factors approximate to zero. Alpha levels on 
the main items indicate that factors appear to be reliable and reasonably valid. 
Finally, the  remaining three  independent variables,  that is  the  hospital  specific 
factor for the type of reimbursement and our two control variables, were measured 
directly via a single question. These variables are summarized in panel B of table 3. 
11 The  variable  "Reimbursement"  was  based  on  a  dummy.  It is  derived  from  the 
question  in  which  respondents  indicated  whether  the  reimbursement  scheme  was 
based on physician specific cost elements such as actual cost or actual cost plus mark-
up  (Reimburse=  retrospective)  or  on  a  fixed  percentage  of revenues  or  hospital 
surpluses  (Reimburse=  prospective).  Next,  the  number  of beds  for  each  hospital 
facility represented our first control variable "Size" while our second control variable 
"Merger" is a zero vs.  one variable (dummy) depending on whether or not a hospital 
indicated to be highly involved in restructuring its operations (e.g. merger). 
[ Insert Table 3 about here] 
4. Empirical findings 
We in fact performed two analyses. The first section uses the three levels of  Table 
2 as the dependent variable. In this way we  can derive the factors that significantly 
differentiate between the various stages of cost system design, that is the drivers of 
cost system refinement. In the next section we study the dichotomy of hospitals that 
do  not perform any  cost system refinement (minimum level)  versus all  others that 
change. This analysis should shed light on the first initiators of cost system change. 
4.1. Drivers of  cost system development 
Because of  the specific order in the level of  cost system design, an ordered logistic 
regression is  actually the most appropriate method for this analysis. Hospitals on an 
advanced  level  (level  3)  are  further  on  the  spectrum  of cost  system  design  than 
12 hospitals  in the process of change (level 2)  or those that only have a legal  system 
(level 1). Modell in Panel B of  Table 4 reports the results of  this regression. 
When studying the general drivers, we only observe a significant positive effect of 
the variable 'cost_  var'. Apparently hospitals that perceive high variability in costs and 
that  attach  high importance to  cost  in  general  are  more  likely to  adjust their  cost 
system in the direction of ABC. Summary statistics in Panel A of Table 4 show that 
especially the hospitals that have changed their system as  a result of ABC-adoption 
(advanced),  seem to  find this issue much more important (higher factor score) than 
those hospitals that are in the process of changing or that only have a legal system. 
The  state  of IT  -systems,  the  perceived complexity  and  the  link  with performance 
(including quality) do not drive or inhibit cost system change in a hospital setting. 
Regarding  the  hospital  specific  elements,  we  observe  more  significant effects. 
First of all,  'satisfaction with the legal system' is  significant and has a negative sign 
(model 1 in panel B). From panel A we can argue that hospitals that are less satisfied 
with the  legal  system are  more  likely to  change  or to  install ABC (level 2 and 3) 
compared to their counterparts that only use a legal system (level  1).  Although the 
system is quite elaborated, some Belgian hospitals seem to be unsatisfied as a result of 
perceived shortcomings to the legal system [15,  16]  and consequently these hospitals 
are more likely to improve their cost system. 
Panel A and Model 1 in Panel B further suggest that high support of the medical 
team towards  cost  control  (Supp  _ med)  is  a  factor  that  significantly  differentiates 
among the  different stages of cost system design.  Unlike in other firms  where cost 
system changes go through top management [12] our results point out that physicians, 
medical boards and heads of nursing departments seem to be powerful coalitions that 
may further stimulate changes towards ABC in hospital settings. 
13 As  suggested in our literature review, the reimbursement scheme is  significant. 
Evidently, when reimbursements are physician cost based (retrospective) rather then 
prospective (e.g. fixed percentage of revenues or surplus), hospitals are less likely to 
change to ABC. Panel A indeed shows that none of the respondents in phase 3 had a 
reimbursement scheme based on physician costs (retrospective), while there are still a 
large  number  of users  of retrospective  schemes  in  phase  2  (45,8%)  and phase  1 
(55,0%). Under retrospective systems, physicians may fear that hospitals will use cost 
system changes to alter the cost-based amount physicians have to refund [36]. At least 
prospective schemes are not based on cost allocations and if they further use a fixed 
percent of hospital  surpluses (instead of revenues),  they  may  stimulate  a need for 
better cost control in order to increase the hospital surplus. 
Our two remaining hospital specific factors  'conflict management-physician' and 
'use  legal  system'  do  not  seem to  differentiate  among  the  different  development 
stages. However, not only arguments of our literature review but also evidence from 
correlation tests  1 allude to a possible link of  the reimbursement scheme with these two 
variables. When reimbursements are based on cost allocations (retrospective), there is 
more conflict between management and physicians probably resulting from  debates 
over  which  cost  to  include  in  the  analysis.  Secondly,  a  likely  explanation  why 
retrospective  systems  may  be  linked  to  higher  use  of the  legal  system  is  that 
physicians may prefer  (or force)  the  legal  system for  cost reimbursements.  Unlike 
with  new  cost  allocations  where  management  may  change  allocation  bases  to 
maximize financial  streams for the hospital [13], the legal system uses at least pre-
defmed  cost  allocation  bases,  so  that  hospital  management  has  less  discretion  to 
maximize cost reimbursements emanating from the physician. 
1 Correlations of conflict and reimbursement (r: -0.367; p:  .009) suggest that relations with physicians 
are less optimal when reimbursements are retrospective. In addition legal systems are also used more 
when reimbursement is physician cost based, though this correlation is weaker (r: 0.262; p: .066). 
14 Due to these interactions, possible effects of 'use_legal' and 'conflict' may not be 
observed in model!. We therefore ran model 2 in which reimbursement was left out 
the regression. Results show that 'conflict' and 'use_legal' become significant. In sum 
this hints that cost system changes are more likely when there is little conflict between 
management and physicians and when legal systems are considered as less useful for 
decision-making, which may in tum be driven by the type of  reimbursement scheme. 
Finally, our variables do not load significantly in both our two models. Apparently 
the hospital's size and its  involvement in mergers do  not differentiate  between the 
different development stages that our survey identified2• 
[ Insert Table 4 about here] 
4.2. Minimum level vs.  the changers 
To single out the first initiators of change, we perform a binary logistic regression 
of those hospitals that do  not change (Minimum:  level  1)  vs.  all others that change 
(level 2 and 3 are taken together). Results are reported in model 3 and 4 of Table 4 
and are similar to the models reported earlier, except for the fact that 'Cost_  var' is not 
significant anymore. The models suggest that the hospital specific factors such as the 
satisfaction with the legal system, the support of medical parties and the method of 
reimbursement (and climate if reimbursement is left out of the analysis) serve as the 
first initiators of change. 'Cost_  var' a general driver becomes only important in later 
stages if  we recognize the difference in intermediate level and advanced level (models 
1 and 2), but not in the current analysis. Summary statistics indeed confirm that this 
general driver especially matters at the more advanced level of  cost system design. 
2  Other measures for size, e.g. the number of  full-time employees, were also not significant. 
15 4.3. Implications a/the results 
Hospitals tend to follow similar stages of cost system refinement as  other industries. 
Our results however suggest that hospitals should stimulate health care specific issues 
rather than the general drivers of other industries.  Only the level of cost variability 
and cost importance as a general driver is important only at more advanced levels of 
ABC adoption.  Hospital specific issues in fact serve as  initiators of change towards 
ABC.  Especially the  support of the medical staff should be  considered if hospitals 
refine their cost system.  Other measures such as  the awareness of limitations of the 
legal  system  can  further  initiate  cost  system  change.  Of special  interest  is  that 
management may need to revise the method of  reimbursements between hospitals and 
physicians in order to ease ABC-adoption. If reimbursements remain physician cost 
based ABC adoption is  difficult; cost system change may then further be precluded 
because of  more conflicts and greater use of  the legal system. 
5. Discussion 
As hospitals' income is  under pressure as  a result of rising health care costs and 
more restrictive budget constraints, hospitals are looking for options to become more 
cost efficient. For assisting their strive for  cost efficiency, health care organizations 
may want to  adopt more refined costing techniques,  such as  activity based costing 
(ABC)  as  they  have  proven to  be  successful  in  other  industries  [6].  However the 
factors  that  facilitate  (or  inhibit)  this  change  towards  ABC  have  not  yet  been 
investigated in hospital settings. Via a survey we single out factors that explain further 
cost system development in a health care context. First of all, the survey shows that 
16 similar  to  other  industries  cost  system  change  in  hospitals  gradually  happens  in 
different  stages.  However  and  more  importantly,  results  indicate  that  the  general 
drivers  of ABC adoption from  other  industries  are  less  crucial  for  promoting cost 
system change in hospitals. Apparently, typical features of  the health care sector such 
as  the  satisfaction with and the use of the existing legal system, the  support of the 
medical  team,  the  level  of conflict  with  and  the  way  in  which  physicians  are 
reimbursed seem to explain variations in cost system development among hospitals. 
Hospitals are quite unique settings in a sense that they have to work with highly 
autonomous groups of  physicians [25, 27]. While cost system changes normally flow 
from top management [12], our results suggest that in hospitals physicians and other 
medical parties are apparently powerful coalitions when it comes to redesigning cost 
systems. Not only the support of the medical team towards cost system change, but 
also a minimal level of conflict with the physician, make cost system change towards 
ABC more likely. The way hospitals arrange their reimbursement with the physicians 
may also require reassessment. If refunds depend on cost allocations, there may be 
endless debates over which cost to  include in the analysis.  Furthermore, physicians 
are not likely to go along with cost system changes as new cost systems such as ABC 
may give hospitals more discretion to maximize the cost reimbursement streams from 
the  physician.  Conversely  changing  to  ABC  is  easier  if reimbursements  are  not 
physician cost based. In sum, it is important for hospitals to consider the stakes of  the 
physician  and  their  support  towards  cost  systems  in  the  process  of cost  system 
refinement. 
The  fact  that specific issues  of the  sector are  more  crucial  for  promoting cost 
system change may explain why hospitals typically lag behind other firms. Installing 
ABC apparently requires a different approach in hospitals. For example, the change of 
17 attitude of  the physician, installing new reimbursement schemes may require time that 
can slow down the process of changing towards ABC.  We however do  not depict 
factors of other industries as not important. Hospital specific factors may be the first 
steps of cost system change, while general drivers may become highly important in 
later stages (e.g. this applied to a certain extent for the general driver cost variability). 
The quality of IT -systems, top management support, the link with performance and 
quality measures, the perceived complexity may all be crucial factors in the process of 
ABC to grow to  a fully  operational  system.  Unfortunately,  we  only had a  limited 
number of hospitals that adapted their cost system via ABC. Therefore, it is difficult 
to recognize further divisions in the type and the level of ABC-systems within this 
group. We however leave this fascinating conjecture for future research. 
Appendix A 
[Insert Table Al about here] 
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21 Table 1. 
Relevant issues in cost system development 
General drivers 
Cost variability (+) 
Cost importance (+) 
Quality link (+) 
System state (+/-) 
Perceived complexity (+/-) 
Hospital specific issues 
Satisfaction legal system (-) 
Use legal system (-) 
Organizational support (+) 
Management-physician conflict 
(+ ifless conflict) 
Reimbursement (retrospective, -) 
22 
Control variables 
Hospital size (+) 
Involved in merger (-) Table 2 
The different phases of  cost system development identified by the survey 
Phases of cost system development 
1. Minimum: Only the legal system 
2. Intermediate: Process of  changing the cost system 













100% Table 3 
Definitions of  the independent variables 
PANEL A: Independent variables as a result of  a factor analysis a 
Definition and main items  Variance  Reliability  b  Range com  posite 
Variable  (item info in armendix A}  EXQlained  (AIQha}  Factor score 
Factor analysis on the general drivers,  4 factors extracted: 
Cost  Var  The importance of cost data  21,96%  0.7433  -2,21 to 1,32 
and the variability of  costs 
(items A, B, C, D) 
Syst_State  The quality of  information  15,58%  0.6693  -2,11 to 2,31 
Systems 
(items G, H, I) 
Complex  The perceived complexity of  14,77%  0.5217  -2,47 to 1,81 
the hospital environment 
(items J, K) 
PerLLink  Extent to which perfonnance  13,58%  0.6382  -1,85 to 2,42 
measures are used in hospital 
(items F and G) 
Factor analysis on the hospital specific elements, 4 factors extracted: 
Sat_Legal  Satisfaction with legal system  23,99%  0.8976  -1,62 to 3,34 
and its perceived accuracy 
(items P, Q, R) 
Supp_Med  The importance that medical  20,52%  0.8418  -2,00 to 2,28 
Parties attach to cost system 
(items M, N, 0) 
Use_Legal  The extent to which legal  14,80%  0.5185  -2,13 to 2,49 
System is used for decisions 
(items S, T, U) 
Conflict C  Level of  management- 12,30%  0.6313  -2,62 to 2,10 
physician conflict 
(items V, W inverted) 
PANEL B: Independent variables based on a single question 
Variables  Definition 
Size (contol)  The number of  beds of  a hospital facility 
Merger(control)  Dummy for whether a hospital is involved in restructuring 
operations (0 for low involvement; 1 otherwise) 
Reimburse (hospital)  Dummy for reimbursement scheme; 0 for prospective; 1 if  it is 
physician cost based (retrospective) 
a Factors extracted using the principle component analysis (rotated solution; Eigenvalues all > 1) 
b Alpha based on the main items between brackets (efr. items with the highest loadings for that factor) 
C Higher scores actually represent a more optimal relation and hence a lower level of conflict 
24 Table 4 
Summary statistics and regression results 
Panel A: Average statistics of  the variables (factor scores) for each cost system phase 
Phase 1  Phase 2  Phase 3 
Minimum  intermediate  advanced 
General 
Cost  Var  -0,28  -0,01  0,96 
Syst_state  0,18  -0,20  0,19 
Complex  -0,03  0,12  -0,36 
Perf link  -0,41  0,33  0,04 
Hospital 
Sat_Legal  0,55  -0,41  -0,21 
Supp_med  -0,49  0,23  0,74 
Use_legal  0,17  -0,03  -0,46 
Conflict"  -0,23  0,07  0,49 
Reimburse (%retrospective)  55,0%  45,8%  0,0% 
Control 
Size (Average No. Beds)  331  426  402 
Restruct (% highly involved)  30,0%  58,3%  33,3% 
"Note that the conflict variable uses the inverted score of  item W. A higher score means less conflict as 
the relation with the physician is more optimal and costs are less used for fmancial control purposes. 
Panel B: Regression results 
Ordered logistic regression"  Binary logistic regressionb 
Three develoQment stages  Minimum level versus changers 
Modell  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Variable  Estimate {sign.)  Estimate (sign.)  Estimate (sign.)  Estimate {sign.) 
Coeff 1  0.249 (.633)  -0.382 (.438)  0.854 (.440)  -0.618 (.391) 
Coeff 2  2.875 (.001)***  2.016 (.001)***  I  I 
General 
Cost  Var  0.588 (.019)**  0.481 (.038)**  1.023 (.102)  0.468 (.265) 
Syst_state  -0.082 (.693)  -0.024 (.904)  -0.609 (.168)  -0.263 (.426) 
Complex  -0.210 (.304)  -0.226 (.176)  -0.128 (.674)  -0.122 (.634) 
Perf Link  0.208 (.365)  0.116 (.592)  0.713 (.207)  0.332 (.388) 
Hospital 
Sat_Legal  -0.750 (.002)***  -0.630 (.002)***  -1.619 (.009)***  -1.135 (.005)*** 
Supp_Med  0.738 (.003)***  0.697 (.003)***  1.108 (.038)*'  0.902 (.046)** 
Use_Legal  -0.287 (.193)  -0.423 (.044)**  -0.171 (.669)  -0.445 (.186) 
Conflict  0.261 (.266)  0.474 (.030r  0.582 (.178)  0.693 (.076)* 
[Reimburse=  1]  -1.183 (.012)**  I  -1.863 (.059)*  I 
Control 
Size  4.2e-04 (.634)  4.2e-04 (.623)  1. 9e-03 (.186)  9.5e-04 (.420) 
[Restruct=  1]  0.297  (.493)  0.271  (.512)  0.621  (.415)  0.952  (.143) 
Chi-square model  41.71 (.001)*'*  35.10 (.001)***  40.4  7 (.001)***  35.46 (.001)'*' 
Pseudo R-square  0.566  0.504  0.555  0.508 
a dependent: Y=l (minimum), Y=2 (intermediate), Y=3 (Advanced) 
b dependent: Y=O (Only a legal system, minimum); Y=l (Changers=intermediate & advanced) 
*  ,  *  *  ,  *  *  *, significant at respectively 10%, 5%, 1  % level 
25 Table AI: Item list (used in factor analyses) and summary statistics per item 
Percentages 
Items  1  2  ~  4  ~  mean  S.D. 
General drivers in other industries 
Cost variability 
A. Certain care processes (DRG's), patients  2%  2%  22%  20%  54%  4,22  1,00 
require more costs than others 
B. The indirect costs constitute a larger part of  0%  10%  24%  34%  32%  3,88  0,98 
total costs 
Cost importance 
C. Cost information is important for staying  2%  6%  12%  27%  53%  4,24  1,01 
competitive as a hospital 
D. Accurate cost data is crucial for our hospital  0%  0%  4%  34%  62%  4,58  0,57 
Quality link 
E. Total Quality Management of our health  0%  2%  18%  31%  49%  4,27  0,83 
care processes is a very important issue 
F. Our personal is rewarded for improving  14%  45%  31%  6%  4%  2,41  0,94 
the quality of  service to the customer 
System State 
G. Cost systems are linked to a spectrum  6%  33%  27%  29%  4%  2,92  1,02 
of different performance measures 
H. The various IT systems (electronic patient  16%  31%  29%  20%  4%  2,65  1,09 
files, inventory) are strongly integrated 
1. It is difficult to use our systems for defining  2%  18%  27%  39%  12%  3,38  1,03 
standard activities at the patient level 
Perceived complexity 
J. Care process in our hospital are highly complex  0%  4%  25%  45%  24%  3,89  0,81 
K. For our specific hospital it is complex to  8%  36%  28%  26%  2%  2,78  1,00 
allocate cost in an accurate manner 
2.  Organizational and behavioral items within health care 
Organizational support 
L. The board of directors strongly supports  7%  7%  35%  39%  13%  3,46  1,03 
cost allocation (top management) 
M. The medical board strongly supports cost  21%  19%  47%  12%  2%  2,56  1,03 
system use (physician) 
N. The physicians strongly favor the use of  26%  19%  42%  12%  2%  2,47  1,08 
cost systems (physician) 
O. Heads of  various nursing departments  23%  21%  46%  10%  0%  2,44  0,97 
support cost control (nursing) 
Satisfaction legal system 
P. We are satisfied with the legal costing system  14%  37%  31%  16%  2%  2,55  0,99 
Q. Cost drivers of  the legal system allocate cost in  12%  45%  31%  10%  2%  2,45  0,90 
a logical manner 
R. Cost calculated under the legal system quite  14%  51%  24%  10%  2%  2,35  0,91 
accurately reflect the true cost 
Use legal system 
S. The legal system is easy to use  6%  24%  16%  39%  14%  3,34  1,17 
T. The legal system is not optimal but it satisfies  10%  33%  33%  16%  8%  2,78  1,08 
our decision needs 
U. The legal system is often used in our decisions  20%  25%  24%  24%  8%  2,75  1,25 
Conflict management-physician 
V. Our relationship with our team of  physicians  4%  18%  22%  49%  8%  3,39  1,00 
can be described as optimal 
W. Cost allocation is only a necessity in  37%  35%  24%  2%  2%  1,96  0,94 
managing financial relations with our 
physicians 
26 